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DIVINE CAUSATION
Richard T. McClelland and Robert J. Deltete

Quentin Smith has argued that it is logically impossible for there to be a
divine cause of the universe. His argument is based on a Humean analysis
of causation (confined to event causation, specifically excluding any consideration of agency) and a principle drawn from that analysis that he takes to
be a logical requirement for every possibly valid theory of causation. He
also thinks that all divine volitions are efficacious of logical necessity. We
argue that all of these claims are faulty, and that theists can resist Smith's
arguments without merely begging the question in favor of a divine cause.

Introduction
In a recent paper, Quentin Smith has advanced the claim that it is logically
impossible for there to be a divine cause of the universe (hereinafter oeU).'
He gives two lines of reasoning for this claim, the first of which tries to
establish what we take to be the conclusion that such divine causes are
prima facie impossible, and the second of which attempts to reach a more
substantive result. According to the first line of argument, there being a
oeu is inconsistent with "all extant definitions of causality;" according to
the second line of argument, a oeu is inconsistent with "a logical requirement upon these and all possible valid definitions or theories of causality. "2
That logical requirement, in tum, is a principle (hereinafter called P) which
says that "For any two particular events or states x and y, if x is a logically
sufficient condition of y, then x is not a cause of y." 3 We think that the
best reading of P is this: letting (a) stand for the claim that event c is the
cause of event e, and letting (b) stand for the claim that event c is not a logically sufficient condition of event e, then P= not-(b) entails not-(a). The
argument here, then, continues that since God is omnipotent, meaning that
"God can do everything that is logically possible 4," anything that God
wills to do always and of logical necessity occurs. Thus, God's willing that
the Big Bang occurs (supposing that the Big Bang is coterminous with the
creation of the universe ') is necessarily efficacious. Given Smith's principle P, the conclusion is that God cannot be a cause of the universe. It further follows that traditional teleological and cosmological arguments for
the existence of God really amow1t to arguments against God's existence.
Classical theism is thus found to be, paradoxically, a rich source of atheistic
proofs. Indeed, since classical theism requires that God be understood as a
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oeu, theism turns out to be necessarily false.
Smith's arguments proceed under various assumptions other than P.
One is that only event causation is to be considered. In particular, Smith
excludes any consideration of so-called agent causation, for reasons important enough to quote at length:
Considerations of agent causality are not germane to our discussion:
our topic is the cause of the universe's beginning to exist, not the
cause of God's act of willing that the universe begin to exist. We are
not examining the relation between God (the agent) and his act of
willing (the effect), but the relation between his act of willing (an
event) and the beginning of the universe (another event). Thus, definitions of agent causality are irrelevant to our arguments: we are
interested only in definitions of event causality, where the cause and
effect are both events. 6
The effect of this move is to set up a schema according to which God is distinguished from God's volitions, and God's volitions are distinguished
from one of their effects, namely the Big Bang (thus: God-volition-BB),
and according to which only the latter two elements need to be considered.
(A similar schema appears elsewhere in Smith's writings, together with his
view that while a divine volition might explain the Big Bang, the divine
volition itself is left unexplained, a mere brute fact. Thus, the connection
between the divine volition and the divine agent whose volition it is, has
no explanatory value and can be partitioned off from the over-arching
account of (alleged) divine causation of the universe. 7) Another assumption of Smith's arguments is univocity: it is his view that causal relations
can be encompassed by a single definition (or theory) that lays down necessary and sufficient conditions for one event to be the cause of another. A
third assumption is that causation is to be understood basically in terms of
the Humean tradition; and it is with this tradition that Smith begins his
preliminary argument.
We think that all three of these assumptions are mistaken, and that
therefore Smith's preliminary argument fails. We also think that his more
fundamental argument (based on P and a premise stating the necessary
efficacy of all divine volitions) can be resisted without merely begging the
question in favor of a DCU. While we recognize that this does nothing to
show that there is a DCU, we think that Smith has failed to show that it is
logically impossible for there to be a oeu. We further think that the manner in which Smith fails to establish his main thesis betrays misunderstandings of the nature of causality and of classical theism. We shall proceed by taking issue with Smith's preliminary argument, and then with the
argument based on P.

Part One: The Humean Argument.
A. The argument:
Smith's prima facie case proceeds in three stages: a review of the Humean
theory of causality, a review of non-Humean theories of causation with a
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view to closing off this way of rescuing the possibility of a DCU, and a
review of various alleged ways in which a classical theist might escape the
Humean argument. Let us consider each of these stages of the argument in
more detail.
According to Hume, Smith claims, there are three requirements for one
event to be related to another as cause to effect: (a) temporal priority; (b)
spatio-temporal contiguity; and (c) constant conjunction or nomological
relatedness. 8 These three conditions are taken to be individually necessary
and jointly sufficient for one event to be the cause of another. According to
Smith, moreover, a oeu will fail at least (b) and (c). If we take God to be a
temporally conditioned entity, then God's willing the Big Bang can be temporally prior to that event, thereby satisfying (a). Since such a formulation
is certainly possible, and arguably better than the Boethian construal of
atemporal eternality, Smith has little objection on this score. However, on
just about any interpretation, classical theism holds that God is a non-spatial
being, so that God's willing the Big Bang lacks spatial location, and thus
fails to satisfy condition (b). Similarly, Smith argues, since God is a supernatural being, God's willing the Big Bang cannot be governed by any naturallaws, and thus fails the condition of nomological relatedness, where that
is understood in a broadly Hempelian way. Indeed, since God is omnipotent, Smith thinks that God's willings would be logically sufficient to bring
about their effects without any reference to covering laws. Therefore, since
God's willing the Big Bang fails two of the three Humean requirements for
"is a cause," God's willing cannot be a cause of the universe.
Turning to more contemporary theories of causation, Smith considers
three possibilities: (1) singularist theories such as that of J.e. Ducasse; (2)
transference (or, as we prefer, transmission) theories (Castaneda, Fair and
the like); and (3) counterfactual theories such as that of David Lewis. With
regard to the first, Smith notes that a DCU is plausibly taken to be a case of
singularist causation, since the creation of the universe (construed as creatio
originans ) is plausibly thought to be a Lmique event. However, he goes on
to argue that such a view will not avail the theist because it still requires
spatia-temporal contiguity, which a DCU fails. Similarly, transference theories are of no use because God is not a physical entity, so that there is
nothing physical (e.g. energy) for God to transmit or transfer in creating
the universe. Moreover, it is no good transmitting something non-physical, "since the Big Bang is wholly physical." Finally, according to Smith, a
DCU fails to fit Lewis' theory because of God's omnipotence: the act of an
omnipotent being is necessarily efficacious, so that God's willing the Big
Bang is also necessarily efficacious; and necessarily efficacious events cannot support the counterfactual relation between cause and effect which his
theory presupposes. At this point in the argument, Smith concludes that
any alternative theory of causation will likely include some condition that
a DCU violates, either because of divine incorporeality, divine omnipotence, or the supernatural character of God. It therefore seems unlikely
that a DCU can satisfy any theory of causation which has developed in the
modem period on the basis laid down by Hume.
Having reviewed Hume's theory of causation and its modem epigoni,
Smith considers three ways-each, he claims, more or less ad hoc-in
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which a theist might resist his argument thus far. The first trades on the
fact that the argument is strictly inductive: a theist may insist that the best
theory of causation has yet to tum up, that a DCU is still logically possible.
Secondly, the theist might insist that a DCU is, after all, unique, and that
we should therefore cobble together a theory of causation to fit it, i.e., a theory that is singularist, non-contiguous, and non-nomological. Thirdly, a
theist might argue that causation is a primitive concept which cannot be
supplied with a theory at all. In that case, the failure of a DCU to fit some
univocal definition of "is a cause" is relatively harmless. Although none of
these three moves seems satisfactory, Smith explicitly argues against only
the third. His reply is that this move is merely question-begging, since a
theist cannot give any reason for making it that is independent of the theistic claim that there is a DCU. 9 We take it that Smith would regard the
other two moves as similarly question-begging.
At this stage, we make three observations about Smith's argument.
The first is that it relies heavily on the Humean tradition of theories of causation. Second, the entire argument proceeds under the assumption of univocity, namely, that "is a cause" can be satisfactorily defined by a single set
of necessary and sufficient conditions. Third, a very important assumption
Smith appeals to repeatedly is that divine omnipotence requires that all
divine volitions are necessarily efficacious and that this necessity is a logical necessity. We think that all three of these assumptions are dubious,
and our reply to the first line of Smith's argument for his main thesis is to
give reasons for so thinking.
B. Reply to the Humean Argument:
1. Concerning univocity:
We doubt that it is possible to give a univocal definition for "is a cause."
Certainly no one has offered a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
causation that has commanded universal assent among philosophers.
More importantly, we know of no theory that can account for the many
kinds of causal relations and the explanations which they generate or to
which they belong. Historical explanations, for example, seem to demand
singularist causation. The events in question here are unique and unrepeatable; and yet it would be perverse to suggest that they have no explanations or that these explanations are not causal. But these causal explanations do not conform to covering-law theories of causality. 10 Likewise, if
mental states are causes of the actions of intentional agents, as we suppose
them to be, and if mental states are not spatio-temporal entities, as we also
suppose them to be, then intentional causal explanations of the actions of
agents are most unlikely to be easily accommodated to any of the standard
theories of causality to which we appeal in cases of physical causation. 11 It
is therefore misguided, in our view, to insist that "is a cause" be given a
univocal definition, despite the drawing power of such a proposal.
Since the days of Socrates there has been a strong tendency in Western
philosophy to define leading concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions, and to require that these conditions cover all uses of those concepts. But there are many philosophically interesting concepts which do
not respond well to this demand. It is notoriously difficult to give neces-
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sary and sufficient conditions for such things as "friendship", "love",
"agency", "mind", "behavior", or "being." We also think that it is undesirable and unreasonable to try to give univocal definitions of such concepts.
This is not to suggest, however, that there are not such things as common
properties or even universals. But, like Wittgenstein, we think that the
search for generality can sometimes be spurious, and that insistence upon a
univocal definition for "is a cause" is an instance of this spurious generalizing. It is much more likely that, as in Wittgenstein's famous example of "is
a game," our concepts of causality bear family resemblances to one another, than that they can be contained in a single univocal definition. If so,
then the failure of a oeu to match up with a univocal definition of "is a
cause" (whether Humean or otherwise) is considerably less damaging than
Smith allows. 12
2. Against the Humean requirements:
There is no doubt that Hume took himself to be offering a theory or definition of causality, and that he supposed temporal priority, spatio-temporal
contiguity, and constant conjunction to be both necessary and sufficient for
the application of "is a cause." Moreover, as is generally agreed, Hume
certainly supposed that the third requirement excluded any necessary relationships between causes and their effects. Indeed, it was the main burden
of Hume's critique of our common sense notions of causality that there can
be no such necessary relationships between causes and effects. And he
almost certainly construed this necessity as strict logical necessity. Thus
there is, according to Hume, no contradiction in supposing that some
causal event occurs and the usual and expected effect event does notY
However, Hume's own requirements for "is a cause" have drawn a good
deal of fire, and, as we will show, are very dubious. 14 The failure of a oeu,
then, to satisfy the Humean requirements, whether in their original eighteenth-century form or in more modern dress, is less momentous than
Smith supposes.
2 (a): On Temporal Priority:
It seems that some causes are simultaneous with their effects. For example,
it is widely held that what physicists call "the collapse of the wave packet"
on the quantum level represents "an instantaneous change of state over a
large area" of space-time. 1" On the macro-Ievet Wesley Salmon gives the
example of a pulse of white light passing through a red-filter: " .. .it is the
intersection of the white light pulse with the red filter that produces the red
light, and the light becomes red at the very time of its passage through the
filter."16 Jom, Lucas refers to similar cases, such as the coloring of copper
sulphate by the light which interacts with it, and the like. It thus appears
that simultaneity is just as fundamental a relation between some causes
and their effects as is temporal priority for other causal relations. The
upshot is that, even in cases of physical causation, strict temporal priority
is not a necessary condition, as Hume held it to be.
The relationship of this Humean requirement to the theistic claim that
there is a DCU is complex. It depends partly on how we resolve the debate
over divine eternality. As is well known, there have been two main concep-
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tions of divine eternality: the traditional Boethian one, in which God is conceived of as a strictly atemporal being, with neither temporal location nor
duration; and the omnitemporal (or "transtemporal," as Lucas has called it)
view, according to which God is temporally conditioned but exists fully at
every moment of time.17 We think that the arguments favor the omnitemporalist view. However, when it comes to the creation of the universe, perhaps the more relevant issue is simultaneity. For creation is not taken by
theists to be the operation of the divine agent upon some pre-existing matter. According to classical theism, God creates the universe "out of nothing" and not, as Plato's demiurge, by rearranging something that already
exists. IS Accordingly, it seems that if God is to be a DCU, the divine cause
must be simultaneous with its effect (the coming to be of the universe).
Moreover, this seems to be so regardless of which view one takes of divine
eternality. However, in so far as the Boethian atemporalist view has difficulty handling the concept of simultaneity, it is at a disadvantage. l "
Smith might reply that God is not a physical being (whether atemporal
or omnitemporal) and thus that Salmon's and Lucas' examples of simultaneous causation are not strictly relevant. But this is beside the point.
Hume constructed his theory of causality to handle physical cases (at the
macro-level, recalling the famous billiard balls), and the Salmon and Lucas
examples refute this part of that theory. The theory stands or falls on the
basis of physical cases. Moreover, if mental states and other intentional
states are not spatio-temporal or physical entities, and yet can have causal
influence, then incorporeality is not a barrier to causality.20
We conclude, then, that Hume's requirement of temporal priority does
not hold up even in cases of ordinary physical causation, whether at the
micro-level of quantum effects, or at the macro-level. A believer in the possibility of a DCU is free to reject this requirement. Thus far, then, the
Humean approach raises no insurmountable barrier to there being a DCU.
2(b): Concerning contiguity and continuity:
Hume himself requires that causes be strictly contiguous with their effects,
both spatially and temporally (the latter is part of his first requirement:
temporal priority). The notion of contiguity belongs with Hume's atomism, and in so far as that atomism is implausible, we have little motivation
to accept contiguity. Hume thought that the contiguity requirement was
given in our experience, and arises therefrom by way of an inevitable, irresis table and veridical idea of that experience. As such, it belongs to his theory of ideas and to his treahnent of the relationship between ideas and language. 2l Probably more directly germane to our discussion is the relation
between Hume's ideas about contiguity and the contemporaneous debate
about" action at a distance," a debate sharpened considerably by Newton's
theory of gravitation, which seemed to require such action. Like Leibniz,
Hume resisted the idea of action at a distance, and the requirement of contiguity insures that there can be no true action at a distance. But the possibility of action at a distance has come back into physical theory as a result
of certain quantum mechanical effects, to which we return below.
Meanwhile, Hume's atomism and ills theory of ideas are subject to sufficient difficulties to suggest that the contiguity requirement is false. More
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importantly, we have ample reason to insist that both space and time are
continuous, and thus that causes and their effects cannot be, strictly speaking, spatially or temporally contiguous. 22
Accordingly, contemporary neo-Humeans theorists have abandoned
the requirement of contiguity, replacing it with spatio-temporal continuity,
a notion which fits much more comfortably with the use of field theories in
modem physics. 23 So, the Humean requirement of spatio-temporal contiguity is no barrier to the logical possibility of a Deu.
However, it seems that the theistic claim still violates the neo-Humean
requirement for spatio-temporal continuity. For while an omnitemporal
God may satisfy the temporal aspect of this requirement, God is not a spatial entity, since God lacks a physical body and is thus not spatially continuous with the universe God allegedly creates. There is, however, a line of
reply open to a theist that Smith has overlooked. It rests on two, admittedly uncertain, claims: (a) that we have some reasons from physical theory to
doubt the necessity of even spatio-temporal continuity; and (b) that we
have some reasons from our experience of our own agency, and independently of theism itself (to avoid begging the question), to reject the requirement as necessary in the case of intentional action by an agent.
There are several results of quantum mechanics that appear to challenge
the assumption of spatio-temporal continuity as a universal feature of naturally occurring events. One is the so-called collapse of the wave packet in
the well-known two-slit experiment.24 There is no widely agreed-upon
interpretation of this result, though it is well-confirmed experimentally.
But one possibility is that action at a distance does occur in nature, at least
at the quantum level. If that is so, then the assumption of spatio-temporal
continuity, as applied to causal sequences, is under threat.
Another threat comes from a second quantum mechanical phenomenon, the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. The phenomenon is
not easily summarized in a short space, and its explanation is controversiaps But the general upshot of the EPR paradox is that it appears to be
possible for two different quantum systems to influence one another when
there is no possibility of spatio-temporally continuous causal influence
passing between them. Once again, therefore, it appears that action at a
distanc€---{)r what is often described as a violation of locality-occurs in
nature, at least at the quantum level. As our knowledge of the physical
world changes, it is possible that we will find ourselves having to reject the
neo-Humean requirement of continuity: indeed, we may already have
done so, for our best physical theories may already require such rejection. 26
Thus, not only is Smith's endorsement of Humean contiguity insecure, but
so is its neo-Humean substitute, continuity. A theist could resist these
requirements without merely begging the question in favor of a oeu.
Our second rationale for resisting the requirements of conliguity, or of
continuity, concerns mental causation. Recall, first of all, that the problem
with the requirement has to do with God's incorporeality. According to
classical theism there are two reasons for thinking that God's creative
action does not occur at some physical distance from the world: first,
because God lacks a spatial location, and second, because God's action
gives rise to the world and does not merely operate upon a previously
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existing matrix. Now, on Smith's analysis of it, the hypothesis is that the
world results from a divine volition or act of will, i.e., an intentional state of
the creating agent. We have to imagine, then, that an agent having no spatial relation to the world nonetheless operates as a cause of the world's
existence. One reason for thinking that this is not possible, Smith claims, is
that it violates contiguity I continuity requirements. However, a theist
might reply that, after alt our own intentional states are quite similar to
what is here required for a OeD: specifically, our intentional states are
causally efficacious, and yet have no spatia-temporal location. In these
cases, too, the causes are operating not at some distance from their effects,
but independently of any spatial considerations. Indeed, it is plausible to
think that intentional states of all kinds are similar: causally effective, but
not spatially related to their effects--or even to their bearers. If so, then
what the theist claims about a DCD has rational support from the metaphysics of intentional states, and this support is independent of theism. 27
It is therefore open to a theist to resist the requirements of contiguity or
continuity, rather in the spirit of G. E. Moore's "I know that this is a hand."
That is, we have better reason to hold onto a plausible account of the metaphysics of intentional states, even though it violates conditions of contiguity or continuity, than we do to hold onto Hume's theory of causation, or to
more recent variants of it. And these reasons do not constitute a mere begging of the question. 28
2(c): The nomological relationship:
The third requirement for a broadly Humean explication of "is a cause" is
that cause and effect be nomologically related. In Hume's original theory,
this relation is understood in terms of "constant conjunction," and it was
this idea that replaced the common-sense notion that causes necessitate
their effects. However, so-called "regularity theories" of causation to which
the notion of constant conjunction gives rise have been subjected to severe
criticism and are no longer regarded as tenable. 29 Perhaps for that reason,
Smith, following Hempel, quickly slides over to a "deductive-nomological"
or "covering law" model for this aspect of his neo-Humean account of causation. In this model a set of statements which may be taken to describe initial conditions and another set of statements describing relevant general
laws together form the explanation for the event in question. The occurrence of the event to be explained causally is derived deductively from the
set of initial conditions and the set of general laws pertaining. 30 Smith
thinks that a OeD is inconsistent with such a nomological condition for "is
a cause" on two grounds: (a) that as a supernatural being, God's actions are
not governed by natural laws of any kind; and (b) because God is omnipotent and his omnipotent willings are necessarily efficacious, the occurrence
of the Big Bang is necessary, given only that God wills it, and without any
contribution by a "covering-Iaw."3! In reply several points can be made.
First, the deductive-nomological (O-N) model of scientific explanation
has itself been the subject of searching criticism. 32 Without rehearsing some
well-known counter-examples, we note that what these examples have in
common is the problem of causal relevance. Provision of a "covering-law,"
or O-N, account does not guarantee that we have given a good causal
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explanation of the events in question. This point can be generalized: in
order to distinguish between covering-law, or D-N, accounts that do succeed in explaining, and those that do not, causal factors must be introduced. It follows that causal explanations cannot be analyzed merely in
terms of the canons of D-N derivations. Richard Miller has put this point
effectively in terms of the following dilemma:
1. Either we add causal factors to covering-law derivations (CLD's)
or we do not.
2. If we do not add them, a CLD (often) fails altogether to explain.
3. If we do add them, a CLD (often) turns out to be explanatorily
superfluous.
4. So, (often) either a CLD fails to explain altogether, or it is explanatorily superfluous.
Either way, we cannot give a general analysis of explanation in terms of
CLD's, and we cannot analyze causality in terms of D-N derivations. 33
The D-N account, then, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
a causal explanation. More relevantly to our purpose: nomological relatedness, understood in terms of the D-N model, is not a necessary component of "is a cause.//
Moreover, such critiques of the D-N model are particularly relevant to
the actions of finite agents such as ourselves. We often make perfectly
intelligible causal claims about our own actions without having in mind
any relevantly applicable covering laws, much less with any ability to supply a deductive-nomological derivation for those actions. As Miller has
said: "Surely, people are not unreasonable to identify a particular episode
of jealousy as the cause of a particular episode of violence .... //34 Such a
claim is intelligible and explanatory, but it neither invokes a general covering law (since none is available) nor supplies a derivation linking cause
and effect by deductive reasoning. The relevance of these considerations to
our immediate problem can be secured by anticipating the results of our
argument in the next section. We there take up Smith's general dismissal
of the relevance of agency to his inquiry into the metaphysics of divine
causation. We think that this dismissal constitutes a serious distortion of
the larger problem of causality and a gross misunderstanding of the metaphysical commibnents of classical theism. Specifically, if causal explanations commonly (perhaps universally) do not depend on nomological
relatedness, in cases involving finite agents, there is no good reason to
think that such relatedness is necessary in the case of an infinite agent. We
think that it is unavoidable for us to model our understanding of divine
agency on our experience of our own agency. And our own causal efficacy
as agents does not require nomological relatedness as Smith has conceived
it. Neither, then, should divine agency be held to the neo-Humean requirement of nomological relatedness in order to qualify as a genuine cause.
The second problem Smith points to with regard to nomological relatedness concerns the necessary efficacy of divine willings or volitions. We
think this claim misunderstands the metaphysical commitments of classical theism. This problem will be treated in the next section of our paper,
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together with a number of issues concerning Smith's hasty dismissal of the
relevance of agency to our general understanding of causation.

Part Two: Agency, Causation and Necessity.
We have argued thus far that anyone who believes that a oeu is logically
possible has ample warrant, resting on grounds independent from theism
itself, for resisting Smith's neo-Humean argument against that possibility.
Our objections to that analysis were partly global (e.g., to its univocity) and
partly particular (that the Humean requirements are commonly violated
by genuine cases of causation). Some of those objections will be pressed
further in this section, especially against univocity. But our main aim here
is to controvert the argument depending on Smith's principle P, which
says: "For any two particular events or states x and y, if x is a logically sufficient condition of y, then x is not a cause of y."35 Smith's argument goes
as follows:
1. P.
2. Any divine volition is a logically sufficient condition of its intentional object.
3. So, no divine volition is a cause.
4. So, in particular, God's willing that the Big Bang occur is not a
cause of the Big Bang.

This is a valid argument, but we think that both of its leading premises are
dubious. Accordingly, we think that the argument could reasonably be
taken to be unsound. A theist could resist the argument without merely
begging the question in favor of a Oeu.
1. Against P:
We ask first "where did Smith get P?" It does not appear to be a generalization, for only a few examples are given and those serve only to illustrate
what P means. Neither is any direct justificatory argument given for P.
Rather, Smith uses his principle repeatedly to show from a variety of
angles how the claims of theists are inconsistent with P. But this is, at
most, a very indirect defense of P itself. It is more likely that P derives
directly from Smith's Humean analysis of causation, upon which analysis
rested his earlier, prima facie, argument against a OCU. As is well known,
Hume insisted that causal relations are not logically necessary. The main
Humean argument goes like this: if there were a logically necessary connection between a cause (C) and an effect (E), then C & -E would be selfcontradictory. But, e & -E is not self-contradictory. So, there is no necessary connection between e and E. Thus, for example, while it would be
very surprising to us should water freeze when it is heated to 212 degrees
Fahrenheit, there is no contradiction in this, for the course of nature might
change, and a sufficiently fundamental change in the nature of water could
result in such behavior. 16 From such considerations, it is not far to Smith's
principle P. However, we have already given reasons for doubting the
general Humean approach to causation. Our criticism has so far been

DIVINE CAUSATION

13

largely negative. But there is a positive critique to advance, one that
advances an alternative to the Humean perspective, according to which P
is either false or largely irrelevant to our understanding of causation, and is
thus not an essential part of every possibly valid definition or theory of
causation, as Smith avers.
According to the alternative view, natural laws, and with them causal
relationships, are grounded in an ontology of things and their properties,
especially their dispositional properties. These properties exist independently of our beliefs, thoughts, expectations or conventions. Dispositional properties, which imbue their bearers with their powers to bring about various
effects under specified conditions, are real, and are not reducible to categorical properties (such as spatio-temporal relations, size, shape, and so on). Of
particular importance are those dispositional properties that are essential
and which conj1.mctively define the natural kinds to which individual material things belong. So construed, such properties are Lockean "real essences,"
which furnish the basis for a scientific exploration of natural kinds and of
kinds of natural processes, and for the discovery of naturallaws. 37
On this view, natural laws are understood to supervene on essences
and to be necessary: "Laws of nature, we argue, are truths whose necessity
is grounded in the essential properties of this world and the things in it.
Hence, it is not the relation between universals that constitutes the necessity
of laws, but rather, their necessity results from the essential nature of the
properties on which the nomological relation supervenes."38 According to
several proponents of this view of natural laws, the concept of necessity
used here is not the same as strict logical necessity, understood as a relation
between propositions: " .. .for it is a contingent matter what natural kinds
there are ... .50 a natural law, unlike a logical truth, would not be true in all
worlds, but would be true in all worlds which contain the natural kinds
mentioned in the law. Hence, a law possesses a kind of conditional necessity: necessity relative to the natural kinds to which it actually refers."]9
Indeed, Harre and Madden have argued that this conditional necessity,
which they call "natural necessity," is neither reducible to nor dependent
upon logical necessity.4D Others in the dispositional essentialist tradition
have argued that "natural necessity" is either just a type of logical necessity
or entails logical necessitiesY The issues are too complex for us to resolve
this dispute. It is agreed by all the writers in this tradition, however, that
natural laws are epistemically contingent and are known a posteriori.
Natural kinds can be seen as complex conjunctive properties: thus, for
example, electrons have a charge of -1.602 x 10 -19 coloumbs, a rest mass of
9.10908 x 10 -.11 kilograms, and a spin of +1/2 Planck units. Any possible
world in which electrons occur has particles with these properties, and
anything in a possible world that fails to have any of these properties cannot be an electron. Similarly, copper has the properties of atomic number
29, atomic weight 63.54, malleability, ductility, fusibility and electrical conductivity. These properties are both dispositional and explanatory; knowledge of them gives us deep insights into the range of typical causal effects
of copper by giving us a detailed account of its nature. Anything that lacks
this nature would not count as copper, and anything that possesses this
cluster of properties will count as copper and necessarily manifests the
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effects of these causal powers. In this view of things, it is properties and
not laws that are fundamental; laws are to be explained by reference to
properties. Indeed, Madden notes that "the concept 'x has the power to
y' ... catches what might be called the strong sense of 'potentiality', namely,
'what would automatically happen if interfering conditions were absent or
taken away.'''42
We have a good deal of sympathy with this view. It is particularly
valuable with regard to scientific knowledge and practice. More particularly, it gives what we think is a very appealing account of the nature of
natural laws. It accounts for their objectivity, locates the difference
between laws and mere regularities, and it explains why laws are confirmed by their instances and have predictive power. It is "bottom up" in
taking natural laws to be descriptive of the essences of natural kinds (or
derivable from laws that are), and explains nomological necessity by
grounding it in essences. 43 As Swoyer has put it: "A chief virtue of the
property theory is that it takes widely acknowledged features of laws at
face value and provides a better explanation of them than do its competitorS."44 Moreover, we think that this approach to causation allows room
for a rich notion of the causal capacities of agents, without any need to
invoke a special theory of agent causation. 45 That development, in turn,
furnishes a solid metaphysical basis for analogies between our own agency
and divine agency, but without begging the truth of theism.
What happens to Smith's principle P if this alternative approach to
causation is adopted? There seem to be two possibilities. On the one
hand, if the necessities ascribed to causal relations by Ellis and company
are or entail logical necessities, then P is clearly false!6 If, on the other
hand, natural necessities are not logical necessities and do not entail logical
necessities, then P is not disproved; but, it does seem to follow that it is not
essential to every possibly valid theory of causation, since P plays no special role in dispositional essentialism. We think that Bigelow and Madden
are right in claiming that natural necessities are not logical necessities and
that they do not entail logical necessities. But, we do not think that P is
essential to every possibly valid theory of causation, and we think that it
does not illuminate the nature of many genuinely causal relationships.
Conversely, the framework of dispositional essentialism is valuable to theistic philosophers precisely because it accords very well with scientific
knowledge and practice and provides a metaphysical framework independent of theism.

2. Against Premise 2.
We have several reasons for rejecting the second premise of Smith's argument, and at least one of these is closely related to-if, indeed, not a further
instance of-our previous argument concerning the modality of causal
necessities.
(a) Regarding agents and their volitions:
As we have noted earlier, Smith explicitly excludes from his investigation
any special role for agency. We believe this tantamount to excluding a
oeu by definition, and Smith himself gives at least two indications that he
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cannot do so consistently. Smith's second premise has to do with divine
volitions or willings. But volitions or willings, whatever else they may be,
always belong to agents. Judith Jarvis Thompson has argued that the conditions for identifying actions from among all other events necessarily
include mention of the agent to which they belong. 47 If, as seems reasonable, we include volitions or willings among the actions of an agent, then
Smith's insistence on treating only event-causation will not serve to keep
the agent wholly out of view. Moreover, Smith's second premise makes
the claim that each and every divine volition is necessarily efficacious. But
this is already to make a very substantial claim about the nature of the
agent whose volitions they are. Evidently, then, Smith already knows a
good deal about that agent and what he knows plays a substantial role in
his argument. It is thus entirely in order for us to insist that investigation
of that agent's nature be taken further. But there is no way to do so short
of consideration of our own agency, for that is the only agency which we
experience directly.'s Smith's exclusion of agency is unjustified, then, both
on general grounds and on the grounds of his own manner of proceeding.
Furthermore, the claim made by theists is that God, a divine agent, is
the originating (and sustaining) cause of the wLiverse, not that some event,
shorn of all connection with its bearer, is the originating cause of the universe. So, unless agents are just events-which nobody thinks-, it is not
possible to confine the discussion solely to relations between events (or
states). The theistic claim is that God causes the universe to exist, and
makes use of an act of will to do SO.49 Events or states are at most the proximate causes of the universe. The ultimate originating cause is the divine
agent and not merely that agent's volition. We have referred earlier to
Smith's schema, according to which the divine agent is split off from divine
volitions, and only one of the latter is allowed to count as a cause of the Big
Bang. This partition is a direct result of the Humean event-ontology within
which Smith's analysis of causation is embedded. We think that it is not
possible correctly to understand the relations between volitions and their
effects without also understanding the relations between those volitions
and the agents whose volitions they are. In particular, we are unlikely to
grasp the modal properties attaching to the volitions-effects relation without also investigating the relations between volitions and agents. A second
objection to Premise 2 should make this clear.
(b) Agents and necessity:
It sometimes happens among agents like ourselves that we can make

things happen with a certain kind of necessity. The key concepts are those
of intervention and prevention. It sometimes happens that we can arrange
for an originating event to lead to an effect and also prevent any other
events in the near spatia-temporal neighborhood from interfering. For
example, we can so arrange things in the set-up of a physical experiment
that nothing in its near neighborhood is at all likely to interfere. Indeed,
one of the main skills of a good experimenter is to anticipate interference
with an experiment's running and to design it so that no interference takes
place. The modality here is practical, not logical: it is not the case that
interference is logically impossible, and yet the outcome is in some sense
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necessary. We call this modality "practical necessity," and we think that it
either is an instance of the "natural necessity" explored by Harre, Madden,
Ellis, and Bigelow, or is closely related to it. Moreover, we think that our
experience with such practically sufficient causation is an important source
of our concepts of alethic modality.50 Furthermore, it is at least possible
that something analogous to practical necessity applies in the case of
divine creation, too.
The question we pose is this: supposing God has determined to create a
universe, what is to prevent this determination from being carried out? Ex
hypothesi, there can be no preventive event from the side of the universe, i.e.,
no event having a spatio-temporal location with the power to prevent the
effects of the divine cause, because there is no universe existing independently of that divine cause to supply it. Prevention, then, can arise only
from within the divine volitional economy. We can think of several ways
this might happen: (a) by virtue of a change in the divine volition (easy
enough for an omnitemporal agent), or (b) by virtue of an inconsistency or
other type of conflict among the divine volitions. It seems to us that it is
logically possible for each of these things to occur (even if they never actually do), and thus that it is logically possible for the nexus of divine intentionality and action to be such that actual creation does not occur even though
the will to create does. That is, we think that the unity of divine intentionality is not automatic and is not a logical necessity. Rather, it is a function of
the previous (infinite) history of the divine agent and of higher order divine
volitions (e.g., the volition to hold steady the lower-order volition to create a
universe).51 Happily for us, if theism is true, God's will to create did not
suffer from any such disunity. Given, then, no universe with an independent existence to supply a preventive event, and a unified divine intentional
structure, the creation of the world becomes unpreventable. And what is
unpreventably true, as Arthur Prior argued long ago, is necessarily true. 52
Moreover, in the case of a divine agent, no appeal to omnipotence need be
made. God makes it unpreventably true that the universe exists by virtue
of the integrity of divine intentionality. The creation of the world, on this
view, is not so much an exhibition of divine power, as it is of divine singleness of purpose. The modality attaching to the divine volition to create a
universe is not logical necessity, but practical necessity.
It is at least possible to understand the traditional doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo in this way. And in that case, divine volitions to create a universe
like ours are practically, but not logically sufficient for their effects. Smith
might reply that such a view of divine agency is out of court, but he can do
so only if he permits an extensive investigation of the nature of divine
agency to go forward. However, his whole approach to the problem of a
DCU prohibits such an investigation.
(c) The problem of incompatibilist freewill:
Consider the hapless Fredd Bloggs. It is part of the tradition of classical
theism that God wills that Fredd Bloggs always do what is morally right.
And yet, notoriously, Fredd does not always do what is morally right. If
every divine volition is necessarily efficacious (as Smith holds), then Fredd
is not free to make his way in the world contrary to the divine will. Rather,
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he is under a metaphysical compulsion always to do what is morally right.
Moreover, if the modality of this compulsion is logical necessity, then the
compulsion is as strong as it can possibly be, for then it is a logical truth
that Fredd always do what is morally right. But if Fredd is possessed of
incompatibilist freewill, then it is genuinely "up to" Fredd whether or not
he always does what is morally right.53 So understood, Fredd's creaturely
freewill is in deep conflict with the view that all divine volitions are necessarily efficacious. Indeed, it cannot be true that every divine volition is
even contingently efficacious. Of course, it is true that compatibilism has
been the dominant mode of resolving the freedom-determinism debate in
the modem period, and that plenty of theists have been compatibilists. But
it is certainly possible to formulate classical theism in terms of incompatibilist freewill, and it seems that once we do so we must reject Premise 2 as,
at best, a gross over-generalization.
It may be replied that our argument overlooks important distinctions
between various types of divine volitions, and that once such distinctions
are drawn, Smith's premise is safe. Thus, we might distinguish between
God's antecedent willing (e.g., that all moral agents always do what is
morally right) and God's consequent willing (what God wills, all things
considered, including what God wills in the event that not every moral
agent always does what is morally right). Or we might distinguish
between God's ethical decrees and God's causal decrees, taking the former
to be contingently efficacious and the latter to be necessarily efficacious.
Or we might distinguish between what God decrees (generally) and what
God desires, taking the latter to be only contingently efficacious.s4 And
perhaps there are other ways of carving up divine volitions such that some
types satisfy our demand for incompatibilist freewill, while other types are
necessarily efficacious. Indeed, we would welcome such a reply, and we
would go much further in exploring the internal structure or dynamics of
divine intentionality. 55 But such a reply is not open to Smith. He has
eschewed any investigation of agency, and thus cannot draw any of these
distinctions between various kinds of divine volitions. Indeed, to appeal to
divine omnipotence as a ground for Premise 2 is already to break the barrier he has erected around agency.
We conclude, then, that a theist can have good grounds for being dissatisfied with Premise 2. Taken at face value, it is an over-generalization.
But it also misconstrues the type of modality which attaches to those divine
volitions which do necessitate their effects. That misconstruction, in tum,
obscures what we think are important complexities attaching to divine
intentionality. These are, of course, metaphysical speculations. But in so
far as they rest on the metaphysics of dispositional essentialism, they cannot be held merely to beg the question in favor of a OeD, since dispositional essentialism is a conceptual framework designed to account for scientific
realism and is independent of theism. But, if Premise 2 collapses, then the
argument which depends on it is unsound.
Concluding Reflections.
It remains for us to survey briefly the results of our inquiry and to suggest
some of its wider implications.
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(a) Smith is hasty and naIve about causation. His approach is broadly
Humean, confined to relations between events, and univocal. The contemporary philosophical discussion of causation has moved beyond these
parameters in several directions that are of special interest to theists: room
is being made in the contemporary discussion (1) for singularist, and
anomic causation, (2) for irreducibly probabilistic causal laws, (3) for consideration of non-event based ontologies, (4) for consideration of agency as
a particular form of singularist causation, and (5) process theories of causation have been widely developed since Salmon's (1984). In our view,
process theories are particularly interesting to theists and others interested
in agency as a form of singularist causation. They also have some obvious
attraction for those drawn to the metaphysics of dispositional essentialism
and property theories of causality.'" A convergence of these approaches
might furnish a particularly powerful metaphysical framework of value to
theists, not least because it is independent of theism and generates a conceptually rich understanding of the natural sciences, as well as furnishing
theists with a rich source of analogies for divine agency. The entire manner in which the discussion of causation has progressed in the last two
decades opens up possibilities that Smith has not taken into account. And
once they are taken into account, it is no longer enough to cast even merely
prima facie doubt on the logical possibility of a DCU by comparing it to a
Humean and univocal analysis of "is a cause."
(b) Smith's main argument against the logical possibility of a DCU rests
on two premises that we think are dubious. Principle P derives from the
broadly Humean analysis of causation which gave rise to the prima facie
argument against a DCU. It is a fundamental principle of Humean empiricism that there are no necessary connections to be found in nature. In the
alternative perspective provided by dispositional essentialism, there are
necessary connections to be found in nature. Depending on how these necessary relations are understood (as logical necessities or as conditional
necessities), we can argue that P is either false or superfluous. Either way,
a theist could reject P without merely begging the question in favor of a
DCU. At the same time, whichever way the debate over modality is
resolved, such a theist need not deny the fundamental tenet of empiricism,
namely that our knowledge of natural kinds is a posteriori. 57
In a similar way, a theist could argue that the other premise of Smith's
main argument is dubious. A case can be made that the intentional actions
of agents sometimes necessitate their effects, and that this necessity (which
we have called "practical necessity") is either the same as Madden and
Ellis' "natural necessity" or analogous to it. Such necessities also attach to
some divine volitions. One way in which Smith's Premise 2 goes wrong is
in supposing that divine volitions logically necessitate their effects. There
are causal necessities which are not logical necessities. Moreover, Premise
2 is guilty of over-generalization, and subject to objections on the basis of
incompatibilist freewill. Smith cannot block these objections without giving to agency a relevance that he has excluded from the outset of his discussion. In any case, a theist may again reject Premise 2 without merely
begging the question in favor of a DCU.
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(c) Smith is also hasty and naive about the tradition of classical theism.
In dismissing agency from any consideration, and in spite of his intentions,

he misconstrues the basic thrust of the theistic claim that the universe originates in (and is sustained by) the intentional and free action of a divine
agent. Action always belongs to agents, and there can be no understanding of the nature of an action without understanding at least something of
the nature of its agent. One must understand the divine agency to understand what is being claimed by theists (if only for the purpose of overturning that claim). And there is no understanding of divine agency, we think,
except by way of understanding our own agency, including its modalities.
It seems perverse to insist that the only legitimate analysis of the causal
influence of agents and their actions is Humean. Such a strategy suggests
that we should understand the actions of the billiard players in terms of
what is happening on the table between the billiard balls, rather than the
other way round. The technical developments in causal theory mentioned
above have made it possible for us to adopt the alternative strategy, and to
do so without merely begging the question in favor of theism and a DCU.
(d) Our conclusion, then, is that Smith fails to establish his main thesis,
namely that "a divine originating and sustaining cause of the universe" is
logically impossible. We close with some final reflections for theistic
philosophers. The first reflection has to do with omnitemporality. It is difficult to imagine what might be the characteristics of a genuinely omnitemporal and infinite life. We have made some claims in this essay about the
structure of divine intentionality and various logical possibilities, some of
which, at least, we think are never realized (e.g., it is logically possible for
God to will and not to act, even if God never actually does so). We think
that the conceptual resources of the omnitemporal point of view have not
been exploited as fully as they might be to illuminate the nature of divine
intentionality and of divine action. (An obvious source of analogies would
be our own experience of the structures of personality and character as
they develop over time.) The second reflection arises from a comment by
John Lucas: "If we, as theists, believe that the universe is fundamentally
personal in character, it follows that our ultimate understanding will not be
in terms of things, which occupy space and mayor may not possess certain
properties, but of persons, who characteristically do things. Action, not
substance, will be our most important category of thought. It is a truth too
long neglected by philosophers."31\ However, agents of our type also are
"things which occupy space and mayor may not have certain properties".
The metaphysics of dispositional essentialism may be a way to explore the
nature of agency and action, as well as a way to elaborate solutions to
problems in the philosophy of science. Even if Smith's argument finally
fails, it is useful for pointing up the importance of approaching problems
about theism in the light of a metaphysical framework that is common
both to our understanding of the natural sciences and also to theism.
Development of such common ground is, we think, incumbent upon theistic philosophers if sound metaphysics is to be done (thereby avoiding
charges of circular reasoning). Our third reflection is that if action is to be
one of our most important categories of thought, then one of the most
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important derivative categories of thought will be interaction, especially
interaction between intentional agents. Analytic philosophy of religion has
largely proceeded under the rubric of Anselmian "perfect being" theology,
where much excellent work has been done. However, we believe that this
framework needs (at least) to be supplemented by a new framework, one
which is dynamic and which takes action, interaction and the conditions
for agency, as central. One aim of the present paper, in answering Smith's
arguments against the logically possibility of a oeu, is to suggest some of
the lines along which such a framework might be constructed.
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